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Abstract—It is a major task to develop effective strategies for 
defending the power system against deliberate attacks. It is 
critical to comprehensively consider the human-related and 
environmental risks and uncertainties, which is missing in 
existing literature. This paper considers the load demand 
uncertainties and wind generation uncertainties in addition to the 
interactive attacker/defender behaviors. Specifically, a defender-
attacker-nature-operator model is proposed, which incorporates 
the attack/defense interaction, the corrective re-dispatch of the 
operator, the coordination between the attack strategy and the 
stochastic nature of load demands and wind generations. The 
Column-and-Constraint Generation (C&CG) algorithm is 
adopted for solving the proposed model by decomposing the 
proposed model into a master problem and a sub-problem. 
Simulations are performed using MATLAB and CPLEX on a 
modified IEEE RTS79 system. The simulation results verify the 
validity of the proposed model. 
 
Index Terms— Power system defense, load demand uncertainty, 
wind generation uncertainty, robust optimization. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The cyber-physical security of power systems is a major 
concern in operation and planning, as the power grid plays a 
critical role in supporting our modern human society. In recent 
years, with the adoption of the cutting-edge smart grid 
technologies, such as renewable generation, microgrid, various 
kinds of flexible alternating current transmission systems 
(FACTS) devices, advanced metering systems [1]-[4], etc., the 
power system is rapidly evolving into a complicated 
interconnected cyber-physical system involving human in the 
loop. They can greatly improve the power system economy 
and flexibility, yet inevitably bring more uncertainties and 
risks of attacks to the power system, which may weaken the 
power system’s secure and reliable operation. 
In the past years, several severe attacks have launched 
against the power grid, which caused tremendous losses. Two 
typical examples were the cyber attack on the Ukrainian power 
grid in 2015 [5] and the shooting at the substation in Silicon 
Valley, USA in 2013 [6]. These kinds of attacks may be more 
frequent and disastrous in the future. Thus, it is urgent to 
defend the power system against man-made attacks. Although 
the N-1 or even N-2 reliability criterion is enforced in the 
power grid, it is insufficient to deal with attacks. Such criteria 
were adopted mainly to deal with the random failures of major 
power system components, but not capable of handling man-
made attacks which may cause the simultaneous outages of 
multiple elements.  
When an attack is imminent, it is usually not affordable to 
defend all the components in a bulk power grid; therefore, it is 
important to identify the key elements. Ideally, the power 
system operator needs to consider the risks/uncertainties 
arising from the nature (e.g., weather, temperature), the 
stochastic behaviors of customers, attacks from the cyber 
domain and physical domain, the uncertain characteristics of 
the power system devices, etc. In the existing literature, some 
researchers proposed interesting models and ideas regarding 
the identification of critical components. The bilevel attacker-
defender model was studied in [7], where the attacker aims to 
maximize the loss while the defender aims to minimize the 
loss. Further, the trilevel defender-attacker-defender model 
was investigated in [8]-[10], where the defender develops the 
optimal defense strategy considering the attacker’s optimal 
strategy in which the power re-dispatch is accounted for. These 
models consider the interaction between the attacker and 
defender, but other factors such as the load demand uncertainty 
and wind generation uncertainty are not considered. 
Actually, the load demand and wind generation 
uncertainties can influence the development of the optimal 
defense strategy as well. It is important to include them to 
derive a more comprehensive model for the identification of 
critical elements, which is the purpose of this paper. The major 
contribution of this paper is that a defender-attacker-nature-
operator model is proposed considering the attacks, the load 
demand uncertainties, and the wind generation uncertainties. 
This model can offer more flexibilities for the power system 
defender to derive a robust defense strategy. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
presents the mathematical model. The solution method is 
explained in Section III. Case studies are demonstrated in 
Section IV to validate the proposed method. Section V 
summarizes this paper and gives the future work.  
II. MATHEMATICAL MODELING 
The power system is faced with the risk of deliberate man-
made attacks, the generators and transmission lines could all 
be targeted and attacked. While an obvious way is to protect 
all the possible targets in case of an attack, it is unrealistic and 
uneconomical, as there can be a huge number of elements in 
the power system and all of them could be potential targets. 
Instead, it is important to identify the most critical components 
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and minimize the loss in the worst-case scenario. A 
representative example method is the trilevel model [8]-[10], 
as shown in Fig. 1. 
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Fig. 1 Conventional trilevel defender-attacker-defender model 
There are three agents in this trilevel model. At the top 
level, the power system defender takes measures to protect 
some selected components. Specifically, the defender can 
conduct intensified patrolling, harden the fencing, or deploy 
alarms to detect and thwart the possible attacks. At the middle 
level, the attacker chooses some critical components within 
his/her capacity. At the bottom level, the power system 
operator re-dispatches the power generation to minimize the 
loss. These three agents take actions sequentially: the defender 
takes actions first, followed by the attacker, and the operator 
acts at last. 
The trilevel model assumes the defender can accurately 
know the loads and renewable generations. Unfortunately, this 
assumption is challenged by the uncertain nature of the load 
demands and wind generations, and it is difficult to accurately 
predict them. If the actual load demands and renewable 
generations deviate from the predictions, the obtained results 
based on the fixed predications might not be the optimal. It is 
necessary and practical to include the load and renewable 
generation uncertainties in the defender’s decision-making. 
A. Load Demand Uncertainty Modeling 
The uncertain load demand 𝑝𝑖
𝑑 is expressed as follows. 
𝑝𝑖
𝑑 = ?̅?𝑖
𝑑 + 𝑝
𝑖
𝑑,+
𝑧𝑖
𝑑+ − 𝑝
𝑖
𝑑,−
𝑧𝑖
𝑑−     ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼                   (1) 
where ?̅?𝑖
𝑑 is the expected load demand at load point 𝑖; 𝑝
𝑖
𝑑,+
is 
the maximum upper deviation of load demand 𝑖; 𝑝
𝑖
𝑑,−
is the 
maximum lower deviation; 𝑧𝑖
𝑑+  and  𝑧𝑖
𝑑−  are the load 
uncertainty factors. The uncertainty factors (𝑧𝑖
𝑑+ , 𝑧𝑖
𝑑−)  are 
constrained within a set 𝒁𝑑, expressed as follows. 
𝒁𝑑 =
{
 
 
 
 0 ≤ 𝑧𝑖
𝑑+ ≤ 1  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼
0 ≤ 𝑧𝑖
𝑑− ≤ 1 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼
𝑧𝑖
𝑑+ + 𝑧𝑖
𝑑− ≤ 1 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 
∑ (𝑧𝑖
𝑑+ + 𝑧𝑖
𝑑−)𝑖∈𝐼 ≤ 𝑢
𝑑
}
 
 
 
 
                      (2) 
where 𝐼 is the set of load demands, and 𝑢𝑑 is the budget of load 
demand uncertainty.  
The load demand uncertainty model represented by (1) and 
(2) suggests that each load can be within a range [ ?̅?𝑖
𝑑 −
𝑝
𝑖
𝑑,−
, ?̅?𝑖
𝑑 + 𝑝
𝑖
𝑑,+
], but the realization of the load uncertainty is 
constrained by 𝑢𝑑. A larger value of 𝑢𝑑 means more possible 
realizations. On the contrary, the uncertainty of the load 
demands is reduced with a smaller value of 𝑢𝑑. 
B. Wind Generation Uncertainty Modeling 
Besides the load demands, the wind generation is also 
stochastic and difficult to be predicted exactly. Assume the set 
of wind farms is 𝐾, for each wind farm 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, the uncertain 
available wind generation 𝑝𝑘
𝑤,𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖
 is modeled as  
𝑝𝑘
𝑤,𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖 = ?̅?𝑘
𝑤 + 𝑝𝑘
𝑤,+𝑧𝑘
𝑤+ − 𝑝𝑘
𝑤,−𝑧𝑘
𝑤−               (3) 
where ?̅?𝑘
𝑤  is the expected wind generation at wind farm 𝑘 ; 
𝑝𝑘
𝑤,+
 and 𝑝𝑘
𝑤,−
 are the maximum upper deviation and the 
maximum lower deviation, respectively; 𝑧𝑘
𝑤+ and 𝑧𝑘
𝑤− are the 
wind generation uncertainty factors, which are constrained 
within the set 𝒁𝑤:  
𝒁𝑤 =
{
 
 
 
 0 ≤ 𝑧𝑘
𝑤+ ≤ 1  ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾
0 ≤ 𝑧𝑘
𝑤− ≤ 1 ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾
𝑧𝑘
𝑤+ + 𝑧𝑘
𝑤− ≤ 1  ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾
∑ (𝑧𝑘
𝑤+ + 𝑧𝑘
𝑤−)𝑘∈𝐾 ≤ 𝑢
𝑤
}
 
 
 
 
                   (4) 
The constraints (3)-(4) show that if the uncertainty factor 
𝑧𝑘
𝑤+(𝑧𝑘
𝑤−) is 1, the  maximum wind generation upper deviation 
(lower deviation) is reached. But the realization of all the wind 
generation uncertainties is limited by the budget of wind 
generation uncertainty 𝑢𝑤. 
C. Proposed Defender-Attacker-Nature-Operator Model 
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Fig. 2 Proposed defender-attacker-nature-operator model 
When the load demand uncertainty and wind generation 
uncertainty are considered, they can be integrated into the 
proposed defender-attacker-nature-operator model as shown in 
Fig. 2. In this model, there are two agents at the middle level, 
i.e., the attacker and the nature. The nature is an imaginary 
agent to determine the realization of the load demands and 
wind generations. These two agents can both influence the 
power system operation state and the related power re-dispatch 
performed by the operator. As such, the worst-case scenario is 
realized when the attacker and the nature collaboratively work 
to maximize the load loss. Thus, the defender should consider 
both the intelligent attack strategy and pessimistic realizations 
of the load demands and wind generations.  
The mathematical modeling of this proposed defender-
attacker-nature-operator model is described as follows. 
min
𝑤𝑔,𝑤𝑓  
max
𝑣𝑔,𝑣𝑓,𝑧𝑤+,
𝑧𝑤−,𝑧𝑑+,𝑧𝑑−
min
𝑝𝑔,𝑝𝑓,𝛿,
 ∆𝑝𝑑,𝑝𝑤
∑ ∆𝑝𝑖
𝑑
𝑖∈𝐼                (5) 
∑ 𝑐𝑙
𝐷,𝑓
𝑙∈𝐿 𝑤𝑙
𝑓 + ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝐷,𝑔
𝑗∈𝐽 𝑤𝑗
𝑔 ≤ 𝑟𝐷                (6) 
∑ 𝑐𝑙
𝐴,𝑓
𝑙∈𝐿 (1 − 𝑣𝑙
𝑓) + ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝐴,𝑔
𝑗∈𝐽 (1 − 𝑣𝑗
𝑔) ≤ 𝑟𝐴         (7) 
𝑝𝑙
𝑓 = (𝑤𝑙
𝑓 + 𝑣𝑙
𝑓 − 𝑤𝑙
𝑓𝑣𝑙
𝑓)
∑ 𝐴𝑛𝑙𝛿𝑛𝑛∈𝑁
𝑥𝑙
       ∀𝑙 (𝜇𝑙)     (8) 
∑ (𝑤𝑗
𝑔 + 𝑣𝑗
𝑔 − 𝑤𝑗
𝑔𝑣𝑗
𝑔)𝑝𝑗
𝑔
𝑗∈𝐽𝑛 −∑ 𝐴𝑛𝑙𝑝𝑙
𝑓
𝑙∈𝐿 +∑ 𝑝𝑘
𝑤
𝑘∈𝐾𝑛 +   
∆𝑝𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑑 = 𝑝𝑖
𝑑        ∀𝑛 (𝜆𝑛)            (9) 
−𝑝
𝑙
𝑓
≤ 𝑝𝑙
𝑓 ≤ 𝑝
𝑙
𝑓
        ∀𝑙 (∅𝑙 , ∅𝑙)               (10) 
0 ≤ 𝑝𝑗
𝑔 ≤  ?̅?𝑗
𝑔        ∀𝑗 (𝛾
𝑗
)                    (11) 
0 ≤ 𝑝𝑘
𝑤 ≤ 𝑝𝑘
𝑤,𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖        ∀𝑘 (𝛽
𝑘
)                 (12) 
0 ≤ ∆𝑝𝑖
𝑑 ≤ 𝑝𝑖
𝑑         ∀𝑖 (𝛼𝑖)                  (13) 
The constants, variable and parameters in (5)-(13) are 
explained as follows. 𝑤𝑔  and 𝑤𝑓  are binary variables 
indicating the defense decisions regarding the generators and 
branches, respectively. When 𝑤𝑔  (𝑤𝑓) is 1, the generator 
(branch) is protected.  𝑣𝑔  and 𝑣𝑓  are binary variables 
indicating the attack decisions regarding the generators and 
branches, respectively. When 𝑣𝑔  is 0, it means the 
corresponding generator is attacked; otherwise, the 
corresponding generator is not attacked. And this is the same 
for 𝑣𝑓. 𝑝𝑔 means the active power outputs of the generators. 
𝑝𝑓  refers to the power flow of the branches. 𝛿 indicates the bus 
voltage angles. ∆𝑝𝑑  means the load curtailments. 𝑝𝑤 refers to 
the dispatched wind power outputs. 𝑐𝑙
𝐷,𝑓
 and 𝑐𝑗
𝐷,𝑔
 are the costs 
required to defend branch 𝑙 and generator 𝑗, respectively. 𝑐𝑙
𝐴,𝑓
 
and 𝑐𝑗
𝐴,𝑔
 are the costs required to attack branch 𝑙 and generator 
𝑗 , respectively.  𝑟𝐷  is the defender’s capacity, and 𝑟𝐴  is the 
total budget the attacker has. 𝐿 is the set of branches; 𝐽 is the 
set of generators; 𝑁 is the set of buses. 𝐴𝑛𝑙 indicates the power 
flow direction, and it is 1 if the power flow on bus 𝑙 is defined 
from bus 𝑛; it is -1 if the power flow on bus 𝑙 is to bus 𝑛; 
otherwise, it is 0. 𝑥𝑙  is the impedance of branch 𝑙. 𝐽𝑛 is the set 
of generators on bus 𝑛; 𝐾𝑛 is the set of wind generations on 
bus 𝑛. 𝑝
𝑙
𝑓
 is the maximum power flow capacity of branch 𝑙; 
 ?̅?𝑗
𝑔
 is the maximum generation capacity of generator 𝑗. 
The objective function is shown in (5) and it is a trilevel 
optimization problem. Constraint (6) represents the limitation 
of the defender’s budget. Constraint (7) indicate the limitation 
of the attacker’s capacity. Constraints (8)-(13) give the power-
dispatch strategy based on the optimal power flow (OPF) 
analysis. Equation (8) calculates the power flows considering 
the attack and defense actions. Equation (9) ensures that the 
incoming and outgoing powers are balanced at each bus. It 
shows that a branch or a generator will be out-of-service only 
when it is not protected but attacked. Constraints (10)-(13) 
indicate the limitations of the power flows, conventional 
generators, wind power generations, and load curtailments.  
III. SOLUTION METHOD  
It is crucial to develop efficient methods to solve the 
optimization problem represented by (1)-(13). In this paper, 
the trilevel problem is decomposed into a master problem 
(MP) and a sub-problem (SP) using the C&CG algorithm [11]. 
The SP involves the middle level and the bottom level when 
the decision variables of the top level are given. The MP 
involves the top level and the bottom level when the decision 
variables of the middle level are given. The MP and SP are 
presented in detail as follows. 
A. Sub-Problem 
The SP is for the attacker and nature to make decisions 
given the defender’s defense strategy. Specifically, the 
attacker determines which elements to attack with the capacity; 
the nature determines the realization of the load demands and 
wind generation within the uncertainty sets.  The objective 
function of SP is shown in (14), which is a bilevel problem. 
max
𝑣𝑔,𝑣𝑓,𝑧𝑤+,
𝑧𝑤−,𝑧𝑑+,𝑧𝑑−
min
𝑝𝑔,𝑝𝑓,𝛿,
 ∆𝑝𝑑,𝑝𝑤
∑ ∆𝑝𝑖
𝑑
𝑖∈𝐼                      (14) 
The related constraints are (1)-(4), (7)-(13), in which the 
values of ?̂?𝑓  and ?̂?𝑔  are given. It is noted here that the 
symbol ?̂? means the given value of the variable 𝑥. A widely 
adopted solution for the bilevel problem is to transform it into 
an equivalent single-level problem. Also, as shown in [12], the 
optimal solutions of the uncertain load demands and wind 
generations will be on the extreme points of their uncertainty 
sets. Thus, 𝑧𝑖
𝑑+ , 𝑧𝑖
𝑑− , 𝑧𝑘
𝑤+  and 𝑧𝑘
𝑤− can shrink to binary 
variables and the issue of multiplication of the continuous 
variables can be avoided, which can alleviate the 
computational complexity. The transformed single-level 
problem is represented in (15)-(30). 
η= max
{𝑣
𝑗
𝑔
,𝑣𝑙
𝑓
𝑧𝑖
𝑑+,𝑧𝑖
𝑑−,𝑧𝑘
𝑤+,𝑧𝑘
𝑤−,𝜇𝑙,𝜆𝑛,∅𝑙,∅𝑙,𝛾𝑗,𝛽𝑘
,𝛼𝑖}
{∑ 𝛾
 𝑗𝑗∈𝑱
𝑃𝑗
𝑔
+
∑ 𝛽
𝑘𝑘∈𝑲
(?̅?𝑘
𝑤 + 𝑝𝑘
𝑤,+𝑧𝑘
𝑤+ − 𝑝𝑘
𝑤,−𝑧𝑘
𝑤−) + ∑ (∅𝑙 − ∅𝑙)𝑙∈𝑳 𝑃𝑙
𝑓
+
∑ (𝜆𝑛|𝑖∈𝑰𝑛 + 𝛼𝑖)𝑖∈𝑰 (?̅?𝑖
𝑑 + 𝑝
𝑖
𝑑,+
𝑧𝑖
𝑑+ − 𝑝
𝑖
𝑑,−
𝑧𝑖
𝑑−)} (15)              
∑ 𝑐𝑙
𝐴,𝑓
𝑙∈𝐿 (1 − 𝑣𝑙
𝑓) + ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝐴,𝑔
𝑗∈𝐽 (1 − 𝑣𝑗
𝑔) ≤ 𝑟𝐴      (16)                        
𝑧𝑖
𝑑+ + 𝑧𝑖
𝑑− ≤ 1                             (17) 
𝑧𝑘
𝑤+ + 𝑧𝑘
𝑤− ≤ 1                             (18) 
∑ (𝑧𝑖
𝑑+ + 𝑧𝑖
𝑑−)𝑖∈𝐼 ≤ 𝑢
𝑑                        (19) 
∑ (𝑧𝑘
𝑤+ + 𝑧𝑘
𝑤−)𝑘∈𝐾 ≤ 𝑢
𝑤                          (20) 
∑ 𝐴𝑛𝑙
𝜇𝑙(?̂?𝑙
𝑓
+𝑣𝑙
𝑓
−?̂?𝑙
𝑓
𝑣𝑙
𝑓
)
𝑥𝑙
𝑛∈𝑁 = 0     ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑵              (21)     
𝜆𝑛|𝑖∈𝑰𝑛 + 𝛼𝑖 ≤ 1          ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑰               (22) 
(?̂?𝑗
𝑔 + 𝑣𝑗
𝑔 − ?̂?𝑗
𝑔𝑣𝑗
𝑔)𝜆𝑛|𝑗∈𝑱𝑛 + 𝛾 𝑗 ≤ 0   ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑱        (23) 
𝜆𝑛|𝑘∈𝑲𝑛 + 𝛽𝑘 ≤ 0                  ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝑲              (24) 
𝜇𝑙 − ∑ 𝐴𝑛𝑙𝑛∈𝑁 𝜆𝑛 + ∅𝑙 + ∅𝑙 = 0       ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳           (25) 
𝛾
 𝑗
≤ 0         ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑱                       (26) 
∅𝑙 ≥ 0        ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳                        (27) 
∅𝑙 ≤ 0        ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝑳                       (28) 
𝛼𝑖 ≤ 0        ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑰                        (29) 
𝛽
𝑘
≤ 0        ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝑲                     (30) 
where η is the equivalent objective function for (14). In (11)-
(30), 𝜇𝑙, ∅𝑙 , ∅𝑙, 𝛾𝑗 , 𝛽𝑘 and 𝛼𝑖 are the duality variables related 
to constraints (8)-(13). There are nonlinear terms (the product 
of a binary variable and a continuous variable) in (15), (21) and 
(23), the big-M method is adopted to linearize them. 
B. Master Problem 
Given the middle level decisions ?̂?𝑓,𝑚, ?̂?𝑔,𝑚, ?̂?𝑑,𝑚 , 
?̂?𝑑+,𝑚 , ?̂?𝑑−,𝑚 , ?̂?𝑤,𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖,,𝑚 , ?̂?𝑤+,𝑚  and  ?̂?𝑤−,𝑚  for each iteration 
𝑚 = 1,⋯ ,𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟 , the MP at iteration 𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟  is shown by (31)-
(41). 
 min
𝑤𝑔,𝑤𝑓,𝑝𝑔,𝑚,𝑝𝑓,𝑚,𝛿𝑚,∆𝑝𝑑,𝑚,𝑝𝑤,𝑚
𝜉                        (31) 
𝜉 ≥ ∑ ∆𝑝𝑖
𝑑,𝑚
𝑖∈𝐼    ∀𝑚 = 1,⋯ ,𝑚
𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟              (32) 
∑ 𝑐𝑙
𝐷,𝑓
𝑙∈𝐿 𝑤𝑙
𝑓 + ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝐷,𝑔
𝑙∈𝐿 𝑤𝑗
𝑔 ≤ 𝑟𝐷               (33) 
?̂?𝑖
𝑑,𝑚 = ?̅?𝑖
𝑑 + 𝑝
𝑖
𝑑,+
?̂?𝑖
𝑑+,𝑚 − 𝑝
𝑖
𝑑,−
?̂?𝑖
𝑑−,𝑚
      ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼       (34) 
?̂?𝑘
𝑤,𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖,,𝑚 = ?̅?𝑘
𝑤 + 𝑝𝑘
𝑤,+?̂?𝑘
𝑤+,𝑚 − 𝑝𝑘
𝑤,−?̂?𝑘
𝑤−,𝑚
 ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾    (35)   
𝑝𝑙
𝑓,𝑚 = (𝑤𝑙
𝑓 + ?̂?𝑙
𝑓,𝑚 − 𝑤𝑙
𝑓?̂?𝑙
𝑓,𝑚)
∑ 𝐴𝑛𝑙𝛿𝑛
𝑚
𝑛∈𝑁
𝑥𝑙
  ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐿    (36) 
∑ (𝑤𝑗
𝑔 + ?̂?𝑗
𝑔,𝑚 −𝑤𝑗
𝑔?̂?𝑗
𝑔,𝑚)𝑝𝑗
𝑔,𝑚
𝑗∈𝐽𝑛 − ∑ 𝐴𝑛𝑙𝑝𝑙
𝑓,𝑚
𝑙∈𝐿 +
∑ 𝑝𝑘
𝑤,𝑚
𝑘∈𝐾𝑛 + ∆𝑝𝑖∈𝐼𝑛
𝑑,𝑚 = ?̂?𝑖
𝑑,𝑚 ∀𝑛 ∈ 𝑁   (37) 
−𝑝
𝑙
𝑓
≤ 𝑝𝑙
𝑓,𝑚 ≤ 𝑝
𝑙
𝑓
      ∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐿                     (38) 
0 ≤ 𝑝𝑗
𝑔,𝑚 ≤  ?̅?𝑗
𝑔         ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽                      (39) 
0 ≤ 𝑝𝑘
𝑤,𝑚 ≤ ?̂?𝑘
𝑤,𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖,,𝑚
      ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾                    (40)    
0 ≤ ∆𝑝𝑖
𝑑,𝑚 ≤ ?̂?𝑖
𝑑,𝑚        ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼                     (41) 
For conciseness, the iteration ∀𝑚 = 1,⋯ ,𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟  is not 
shown in (34)-(41). The MP is a mixed integer linear 
programming (MILP) problem, which can be solved by 
commercial tools like CPLEX solver. 
C. C&CG Algorithm 
Based on the MP and SP, the proposed defender-attacker-
nature-operator model is solved using C&CG algorithm [11] 
illustrated in Fig. 3.  
Solve the SP with (15)-(30), and 
get the upper bound
Converged?
Obtain  the optimal solution results
No
Solve the MP with (31)-(41), and 
get the lower bound
Yes
Initialize the solution
 
Fig. 3 C&CG algorithm implementation 
IV. CASE STUDIES  
The case studies are carried out to validate the proposed 
model and solution method based on a modified RTS79 
system. The original RTS79 system [13] has 24 buses, 2850 
MW load and 32 generators. In our case studies, the original 
generators 3, 14, and 31 are removed, and 3 wind farms are 
added to buses 1, 13, and 23. The case studies are performed 
using MATLAB and CPLEX solver. 
A. Base Case  
As a case study, assume the expected wind generation at 
those three wind farms are 160 MW, 150 MW and 120 MW, 
respectively; the maximum upper deviations and the maximum 
lower deviations of the wind generations are all 20% of the 
expected wind generations. Further, the expected values of the 
load demand predication are as in [12], and the maximum 
upper deviations and the maximum lower deviations of the 
load demands are all 30 MW. The budget of load demand 
uncertainty  𝑢𝑑 is 5, and the budget of wind generation 
uncertainty 𝑢𝑤 is 3. 𝑐𝑙
𝐷,𝑓
, 𝑐𝑗
𝐷,𝑔
, 𝑐𝑙
𝐴,𝑓
 and 𝑐𝑗
𝐴,𝑔
 are 1. And the 
defender’s budget is 3 and the attacker’s capability is 3.  
The simulation is conducted using a laptop with 8 GB 
RAM, and it takes 419 seconds to finish the simulation. The 
convergence of the C&CG method is reached after six 
iterations as shown in Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4 Convergence of the C&CCG method 
The simulation results are shown in Table I, also the 
realizations of the uncertainties are shown in Fig. 5. As a 
comparison to demonstrate the coordination between the 
attacker and nature, a case study is conducted when the attack 
is considered but neglecting the load demand and wind 
generation uncertainties, the load loss will be reduced to 210 
MW and the protected/defended elements can change, as 
shown in Table I.  Also, if the attacks are not considered but 
the load demand are considered, the load curtailment is 0 MW. 
These comparisons show that the worst-case load loss can only 
be realized with the coordination between the attacks and the 
uncertainties of load demands and wind generations. 
Table I. Defended and attacked components 
Variables 
Consider uncertainties 
and attacks 
Only consider 
attacks 
Load loss (MW) 399 210 
Defended lines 25 37 
Defended generators 20, 21 20, 21 
Attacked lines N/A 25, 26, 28 
Attacked generators 11, 12, 29 N/A 
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Fig. 5 Realization of the uncertainties in the worst-case scenario 
B. Sensitivity Analysis of  Load Demand Uncertainty  
The influence of the load demand uncertainty is shown 
when the maximum upper/lower deviations of the load 
demands vary while all other parameters are the same as in the 
base case. The simulation results are shown in Table II. It can 
be seen that with the increase of deviations, the load loss in the 
worst-case scenario increases. 
Table II. Sensitivity analysis of load demand uncertainty 
Maximum deviations (MW) Load loss (MW) 
0 272 
10 322 
20 349 
30 399 
40 427 
C. Sensitivity Analysis of  Defense Budget  
Table III. Sensitivity analysis of defense budget 
 Defense Budget 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Load loss 
(MW) 
805 602 422 399 375 291 
Defended 
lines 
N/A N/A  N/A  25 25 28, 29 
Defended 
generators 
N/A 21 20, 21 20, 21 
20, 21, 
29 
20, 21, 
29 
Attacked 
lines 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
23, 27, 
29 
21, 22, 
23 
Attacked 
generators 
20, 21, 
29 
12, 20, 
29 
25,  
26, 28 
11, 12, 
29 
N/A N/A 
Table III shows the results with different defense budgets. 
The load loss, defended lines/generators, and attacked 
lines/generators for each defense budget are provided. It 
demonstrates that with the increase of defense budget, the load 
loss will decrease, which can provide valuable information 
about the budget needed to maintain the power system risk 
below a certain level. For example, if the power system 
defender wants to ensure that the load loss is below 400 MW, 
the minimum budget required is 3. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper proposes a defender-attacker-nature-operator 
model to identify the critical components that should be 
defended in case of a potential attack, and the load demand 
uncertainties and renewable generation uncertainties are 
included in this model. The model is a trilevel optimization 
problem with the defender at the top level, the attacker and 
nature at the middle level, and the operator at the bottom level. 
This problem is solved by the C&CG method, which is a 
widely used robust optimization solution approach. Case 
studies and sensitivity analyses are performed based on a 
modified IEEE RTS79 system, which demonstrates that the 
proposed model is effective in identifying the key elements for 
power system defense. 
In the future work, more uncertainties related to other 
components will be included, such as the solar generations, 
energy storage, electric vehicles, etc. Also, other methods will 
be explored to further decrease the computational time.  
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